How do I answer this question

Time Remaining Return Ne 1 1 point Bread Basket and Quick Lunch are the only two sandwich shops serving a small town. Each shop can choose to set a high price or a low price for sandwiches. The payoff matrix above shows the daily profits for each combination of prices that the two shops could choose. The first entry shows Bread Basket's profits, and the second entry show Quick Lunch's profits. Assuming that both shops know the information shown in the matrix, answer the following: a) Does each shop have a dominant strategy to set a high price, a dominant strategy to set a low price, or does it have no dominant strategy? 1. Bread Basket 2. Quick Lunch b) If the two shops do not cooperate on setting prices, what will be the profit for each shop? 1. Bread Basket 2. Quick Lunch c) Does a Nash equilibrium exist in this model? If no, explain why. If so, identify the equilibrium. Quick Lunch High Price Low Price High Price $150, $180 $130, $120 Bread Basket Low Price $120, $130 $140, $110 B IYA ALBEE x X 12pt Paragraph 4:37 PM here to search O w T X 3/30/2021