how does game tree look like in this question?

1. (25 points total) Consider a two-player game in extensive form with perfect information with a set of terminal histories 0 = {(U, A),(U,B),(U.C), (D.Q),(D,R,T), (D, R, S)). Player 1 prefers (U, A) to (U, B) to (D,Q) to (D, R, T) to (D, R, S) to (U.C), and player 2 prefers (U,C) to (D,R,T), is indifferent be- tween (D, R, T) and (D.Q), and prefers(D,Q) to (U, A) to (U, B) to (D, R, S). Assume a player function - that determines which player moves at each decision node given by P(6) P(D, R) = = 1 and P(U) = P(D) = 2. (a) (5 points) Write a game tree that represents the interaction in this game. (b) (5 points) List the strategies of player 1 and those of player 2. (c) (5 points) Find all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game. (d) (5 points) Write the equivalent strategic form. (e) (5 points) Find all the Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) of this game. 1. (25 points total) Consider a two-player game in extensive form with perfect information with a set of terminal histories 0 = {(U, A),(U,B),(U.C), (D.Q),(D,R,T), (D, R, S)). Player 1 prefers (U, A) to (U, B) to (D,Q) to (D, R, T) to (D, R, S) to (U.C), and player 2 prefers (U,C) to (D,R,T), is indifferent be- tween (D, R, T) and (D.Q), and prefers(D,Q) to (U, A) to (U, B) to (D, R, S). Assume a player function - that determines which player moves at each decision node given by P(6) P(D, R) = = 1 and P(U) = P(D) = 2. (a) (5 points) Write a game tree that represents the interaction in this game. (b) (5 points) List the strategies of player 1 and those of player 2. (c) (5 points) Find all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game. (d) (5 points) Write the equivalent strategic form. (e) (5 points) Find all the Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) of this game