how to solve this problem

\"sider a three player game. In this game, player 1 moves rst and can propose to either Player 2 or to player 3 (but not both). If player 2 gets the proposal, she can either accept it or reject. The game is over following either of the actions. The payoffs are (1, 1, 1) if the offer is accepted and it is (0,0,0) if the offer is rejected. If however, player 3 gets the proposal, he can either accept it or reject and propose to player 2. If she accepts the offer, the game is over with payoffs (2, 2, 1). If Player 3 reject and proposes to player 2, player 2 can accept the offer (with the resulting payoffs (0, 1, 2)) or she can reject resulting in the payoff vector (0,0,0). (a) Draw the extensive form for this game. (b) Describe a representative strategy for each player and the payoffs associated with this strategy. (c) What is the set of subgame perfect equilibrium for this game? (d) Is there a Nash equilibrium of this game that is not subgame perfect