Question: I have a problem to solve question 4 it is related to auctions , thanks 10:31 7 Done moodle.concordia.ca C Econ 613 Homework 6 Department

I have a problem to solve question 4 it is related to auctions , thanks

10:31 7 Done moodle.concordia.ca C Econ 613 Homework 6 Department of Economics Concordia University Due 13rd April, 2022 Provide complete work that leads to each answer. Do the prob- lems in the order given. Instructor: LI, Ming 1. Consider the first-price auction with independent private values, where each bidder's valuation, Vi, is distributed on [0, 1] according to distri- bution F, with pdf f. (a) Show that conditioning on Vi 1. (a) In a first-price auction, could there exist an equilibrium in which Buyer 1 bids Bi(v) = av and Buyer 2 bids B2(v) = Bv, where a, B > 0? Why or why not? (b) Answer the same question for a second-price auction
Step by Step Solution
There are 3 Steps involved in it
Get step-by-step solutions from verified subject matter experts
