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Consider the following 2-player game. Players are called "Sender" and "Receiver". Sender privately observes eco = {1. ...,10}, which is drawn from some commonly-known probability mass function f with full support (i.e., ve, f(0) > 0). Sender then chooses a message me M(0) = {0, 0}. That is, Sender can either send the message m = 0 or m =0. After observing the message (but not 0), Receiver chooses an action a e R. Payoffs for Sender and Receiver are respectively given by us(a, m, 0) = a and up(a, 8, m) = -(a - 0). (a) Draw an extensive form to represent a simplified version of this game where de {1, 2} and a e {1, 2}. (b) Given any belief (m) ( 40 that Receiver has about o after message m, what is her sequentially rational action? (Here, and below, return to the full game, not the simplified version from part (a).)(c) Which strategy profiles can be supported in PBE? (Don't forget to describe beliefs.) What are the Receiver's payoffs across these PBE? (d) Can you give an alternative solution concept that does not involve beliefs that leads to all the same outcomes i.e., strategy profiles as PBE