I need help with this microeconomics question.

> A Moving to another question will save this response. Question 1 of 5 > >> Question 1 2 points Save Answer Consider the simple streetlight game. A player in the game can either contribute to providing a streetlight, or not. If enough people contribute the light is provided. If not, then the light is not provided. The payoffs are given in the table. U = utility from the light, C = cost of providing the light. They spilt the cost if they both contribute. Assume U> C/2 and C > U. This means that the individual would not find it in their own interest to provide the light because of the cost being greater than the individual benefit, C> U. Let S = stigma from not contributing. Assume S = 0. What is the Nash equilibrium if the game is played once? B Contribute Don't Contribute Contribute U - C/2, U - C/2 U - C, U - S A Don't Contribute U - S, U - C - S, - S O Contribute, Contribute O Contribute, Don't Contribute Don't Contribute, Contribute O Don't Contribute, Don't Contribute