i need only answer for question number 3.

CASE Wal-Mart Goes to Germany Wal-Mart, well known as an ultra-American company, is developing it self internationally. It is already a major sales force in Canada and Mex- ico and is currently expanding into Asian and European markets. Although the stores in the United States currently maintain Wal-Mart's highly successful financial standing, forecasters predict that an inter national presence will be the primary source of future growth In 1997, Wal-Mart bought the German Wertkauf chain, comprised of 21 stores. In 1998, it purchased the 74-store Interspar chain. It upgraded and remodeled these stores using the same pattern used for its stores in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. As of 2001, however, Wal- Mart had lost $200 million on these 95 stores, the result of several prob- lems it hadn't considered at the outset. Some of the intercultural problems should have been expected: complying with commercial regulations in Germany can delay the opening of a "hypermarket" such as Wal-Mart by as much as five years. In September 2001, the German Cartel Office set standards for the minimum price of some items: a level of government interven- tion that Wal-Mart officials were unprepared for. Wal-Mart also faced 14 competitive hypermarket chains, all of which are well known already to the German people. Add to that mix a sluggish German market, and it was already apparent that Wal-Mart was fac ing a major challenge. In addition to these external factors, Wal-Mart made some internal mistakes. The original managers of the Wertkauf and Interspar chains re sented the fact that Americans had come into their stores and were telling them how to do their jobs. The message these managers received was that American methods were better. This tension was increased when they found that the new American bosses didn't speak German and insisted on American marketing practices. And when Wal-Mart tried to impose its own supply system on vendors who were used to do- ing things differently, the vendors simply refused to stock Wal-Mart warehouses. Wal-Mart realizes that it didn't strategize its intercultural approach or messages well when it entered the German market. As the CEO, H. Lee Scott, Jr., said, "We just walked in and said, 'We're going to lower prices, we're going to add people to the stores, we're going to remodel the stores because inherently that's correct, and it wasn't. We didn't have the infrastructure to support the kind of things we were doing. What do you think Wal-Mart did to make its stores in Germany more successful? Some questions to consider 1. Do you think there are cultural differences between the German market and the American market? What might they be? 2. Why would German managers and vendors revolt against American business practices? 3. Why do you think the Wal-Mart executives didn't intraperson- ally think about the context in which they were communicating