[Q: 13-3871726] Suppose that the payoffs two firms face are as shown in the payoff matrix...

 

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[Q: 13-3871726] Suppose that the payoffs two firms face are as shown in the payoff matrix to the right. Given these payoffs, Firm 2 wants to match Firm 1's price, but Firm 1 does not want to match Firm 2's price. What, if any, are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game? OA. The two pure-strategy Nash equilibria are for the firms to select the low price and for the firms to select the high price. OB. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to select the low price. OC. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to select the high price. OD. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to select the high price and for Firm 2 to select the low price. OE. This game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibria. MacBook Pro Low Price Firm 2 High Price Low Price $6 $0 SO $21 Firm High Price $3 $15 $6 $15 Time Remaining: 01:19:32 D Next [Q: 13-3871726] Suppose that the payoffs two firms face are as shown in the payoff matrix to the right. Given these payoffs, Firm 2 wants to match Firm 1's price, but Firm 1 does not want to match Firm 2's price. What, if any, are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game? OA. The two pure-strategy Nash equilibria are for the firms to select the low price and for the firms to select the high price. OB. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to select the low price. OC. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is for both firms to select the high price. OD. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to select the high price and for Firm 2 to select the low price. OE. This game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibria. MacBook Pro Low Price Firm 2 High Price Low Price $6 $0 SO $21 Firm High Price $3 $15 $6 $15 Time Remaining: 01:19:32 D Next

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