Question: In a labor-market separating equilibrium with high-skill and low-skill workers and where a costly educational degree is used solely as a signal device, we can

In a labor-market separating equilibrium with high-skill and low-skill workers and where a costly educational degree is used solely as a signal device, we can say that A. education is socially efficient. B. education is socially inefficient because it is costly and provides no useful skills to the worker. C. education is privately inefficient for high-skill workers. D. education is privately useful for low-skill workers only

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