Question: In class, we discussed how merger simulation involved inferring marginal cost from observing demand and market shares. This problem is related. Two firms produce a
In class, we discussed how merger simulation involved inferring marginal cost from observing demand and market shares. This problem is related.
Two firms produce a homogenous good and set quantities simultaneously (that is, they play a static Cournot game). Suppose that demand is Q = 100-P.
What is the inverse demand function?
What are the best response functions? Write them in terms of Q1, Q2, MC1 and MC2.
If both firms pick quantities Q1=Q2=30, what is the marginal cost of each firm?
If firm 1 picks Q1=25 and firm 2 picks Q2=35, what is the marginal cost of each firm?
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