Instructions: Using the lecture notes provided answer the following essay below providing 1) the question at the beginning of the essay; 2) an opening paragraph that provides a thesis statement (an answer to the full question) before 3) developing the ideas of the introductory paragraph within the body of your essay

Essay Question:

The Problem of Contradiction: In what way does the Problem of Contradiction undermine either: a) cultural relativism or b) subjectivism [or both] as positions that support ethical relativism? In light of this problem, can either be still be considered a viable theory? Why or why not?"

Module 01 - Lecture Notes

Introduction

What is the right thing to do? And how do we know? Of course, I think that it is true that when we begin to talk about the right thing to do, we should have reasons for doing so. So we will begin this module with a short discussion about the nature of arguments. Many philosophers hold that the right thing to do is the product of living the right kind of life. Many have held that the best life is the life of pleasure (hedonism). Other introductory questions are questions of meta-ethics, and is it possible that any of our claims about the right thing to do are actually true (or is ethics simply relative)? In this first module we will start to address these questions, and more!

I. Investigating Ethical Theory

Following Shafer-Landau in his introductory chapter to our text, The Ethical Life, this introductory module covers three core areas, that of: a) value theory; b) normative ethics; and c) metaethics (Shafer-Landau, IMFOE, Introduction). When philosophers talk about a) value theory, we are talking about a family of questions: What makes for a good life? What makes a life that is worth living? What kinds of things are worth doing for their own sake? When philosophers talk about b) normative ethics, we are asking questions about reasons for why the right thing to do is in fact, the right thing to do; or, our moral duties and how we ought to behave. For example, some might say that we ought to do X because it produces the best overall effect (Consequentialism); or we ought to do X because it is our duty to do X (which we find in Kantian deontology or Contractarianism). c) And metaethics address questions about the status of ethics (For example, is ethics genuinely objective? Or, can we have moral knowledge at all?). Some philosophers (and non-philosophers), who are moral skeptics hold that the enterprise of moral philosophy is a lost cause, if not intellectually "bankrupt." We will see that even if such views are correct, they cannot be accepted without argument and do not entail that ethics is not worth our study and investigation.

In reflecting upon ethics as a topic, it is obviously difficult to pinpoint a precise definition of morality, but suffice to say that as a subject of inquiry, it is axiological in focus, like other fields where we make value judgments. Such judgments that can be expressed in terms of what we ought to do, or how things should take place. Note that it is closely related to the fields of law, etiquette, and esthetics (the study of beauty). In each of these fields (as we have in many others), the claims that are made within them require argument. All arguments, including moral arguments, are made up of claims that articulate reasons. These claims, which can be expressed as statements (an assertion that is either true or false); in an argument, the claims that support another claim are called premises. And the claim that is supported by those claims or reasons is the conclusion. Arguments that contain reasoning such that if the premises are true, the conclusions must be true, or guarantee the truth of the conclusion are "valid arguments." Another way of thinking about valid arguments is that it is impossible for a valid argument to have all true premises and a false conclusion. True premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion IF the conclusion is supported by the premises. But note, it is possible to have a valid with false premises, so long as the premises conclusively entail the conclusion if they were all true. Valid arguments that have premises that are in fact true are called "sound arguments." As Shafer-Landau points out: "The task of moral philosophy is to use rational argument to assess the merits of different moral principles, including very general moral theories that seek to cover a wide variety of particular cases" (Shafer-Landau, IMFOE, Introduction).

II. Hedonism

While we will touch on other theories of the good life when we look at consequentialism and virtue theory, any such theory of the good life is concerned with what is necessary for life to go well, if not better. Hedonism is a theory of the good life that holds that the only thing that is intrinsically good, or good for its own sake, is pleasure, and that pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad. For something that is instrumentally good, by contrast, means that it isn't something that can be good in itself, but is valuable only to the degree that it helps us to obtain something else that is good in itself. Hedonists observe that the term 'hedonism' has received a bad rap by some, as it is sometimes referred to as a "swine philosophy," to the chagrin of two important hedonists of the past, Epicurus (341 BCE - 270 BCE) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). However, as Shafer-Landau points out, "Hedonists make a distinction between physical pleasure, which consists of pleasant feelings or sensations, and attitudinal pleasure, which is the positive attitude of enjoyment. If hedonism is to be plausible, we must understand it as the claim that the only attitudenal pleasure is intrinsically good for us" (Shafer-Landau, IMFOE, Chapter 1).

In spite of its connotations, hedonism has many attractive qualities. Among them is that there are many different ways of living a valuable life. This in turn permits a degree of autonomy over what we hold to be good or bad for us. It is also difficult to resist the intuition that happiness is good for everyone and that misery and unhappiness is bad for everyone, regardless of their level of sentience (i.e., animals and human beings). It also provides a plausible place to begin when determining the starting point for our expectations and the differences most of us have regarding what brings us happiness(Shafer-Landau, IMFOE, Chapter 1).

III. A Challenge to Hedonism? Robert Nozick: The Experience Machine

The late Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick (1938-2002), in his thought experiment, "The Experience Machine" presents a thought experiment in which we are given the option to plug into an "experience machine." Such a machine provides a simulation of any experience we wish, if we wish, for the rest of our lives (adjusting for an initial two-year opportunity to pause). Yet in spite of the option of all of our loved ones also plugging in, we would not (at least not most of us would not), actually choose to plug into such a machine. The reason is that there are certain things we would like to do and accomplish that would not be possible for us if we lived in a simulated world. If Nozick is correct, then it is clear that there is something more that matters to us than how things feel "from the inside." If hedonism is correct, then our well-being is no more than a function of our mental states. But Nozick's experience machine undermines this doctrine, in spite of its (initial) plausibility (Shafer-Landau, IMTEL, Chapter 2).

IV. Ethical Relativism

The third and final topic of this first module will be an exploration of the topic of metaethics, and in particular, ethical relativism. Ethical relativism stands in contrast to ethical objectivism, which is "the view that some moral standards are objective correct and apply to everyone even if people don't believe they do and even if obeying them fails to satisfy anyone's desires" (Shafer-Landau, IMFOE, Chapter 19). The denial of ethical objectivism, moral skepticism can be found in two forms: moral nihilism and ethical relativism. In this module we will only be concerned with ethical relativism, which takes two different forms: a) ethical subjectivism, and b) cultural relativism. By a) ethical subjectivism, we mean that the moral rightness of an action is based on my approval of it or if my commitments allow for it. And on b) cultural relativism, we mean that the rightness of an action depends on the fact that the "guiding ideals of a particular society in which they are performed" (ibid). In spite of their difference in scope, they agree on two points: i) morality is a strictly human construction; and ii) the moral standards and ideals of one person or group are of equal value, and no one set of standards and ideals of one person or group is better or worse than another. And so, as Shafer-Landau observes, the attraction of relativism is obvious, for four reasons. First, it provides an account of why morality is exclusively for human beings; second, it is scientifically respectable (from an anthropological point of view); third, it provides an explanation for how moral knowledge is possible and finally, it is remarkably egalitarian with respect to both wide scope or narrow scope considerations (ibid).

Nevertheless, there are a number of problems with ethical relativism. First: If ethical relativism is true, then no individual's group or opinions regarding morality can ever be mistaken. They are always correct. But the implication is that moral progress would be impossible, and most people would hold that there are a number of advancements of ethical significance that we have made within the last hundred years in terms of human rights and like issues. Second: Both subjectivism and cultural relativism appear to lead to what we might call the Problem of Contradiction, as they hold that the same actions can be right (for one person or society), and wrong (for another person or society). While it might seem that both ethical relativism and subjectivism can avoid this second problem by simply recasting moral claims as reports of approval at either the personal or the cultural level. But this would then make it impossible to have genuine moral disagreement (ibid).

This first module is obviously introductory in nature, and it is hoped, provides some "flavor" of how to go about doing ethics, and hopefully, normative ethics, in the modules to come!

Sources

IMFOE = Instructor's Manual with Test Bank designed to accompany The Fundamentals of Ethics 5e. By Russ Shafer-Landau. Prepared by Justin Horn and Ben Schwan. Oxford University Press. New York. 2020.

IMTEL = Instructor's Manual with Test Bank designed to accompany The Ethical Life 5e. By Russ Shafer-Landau. Prepared by Justin Horn, Ben Schwan, and Emma Prendergast. Oxford University Press. New York. 2020/21.