It is worrisome that corruption has spread to almost all customs administrations especially in the developing countries as well as the developed ones. Accused to cost customs business around USD $2$ billion all over the world, customs corruption has turned into an extremely significant obstacle of equal business and growth, and economic stability $($McLinden & Durrani, $2013).$ Many problems are inherent in combating corruption: the main goal of most administrations of customs is the purity of officials. The WCO has been very much involved in dealing with these aspects by providing tools and the guidelines such as the Arusha Declaration to enhance control of corruption and enhance on customs integrity among the administrations of the member states $($WCO$,2003).$ Nevertheless, with these efforts, a conventional anti$-$corruption measure usually has a problematic theory, as they usually do not take into account the group aspect of corruption and psychological factors that affect individuals.

Customs anti$-$corruption policymaking has largely depended on the Principle$-$Agent Model of corruption that assumes corruption is the result of inadequate information between the principal $($government or authority$)$ and the agent $($customs officials$).$ This model suggests that when officials in the customs post are convinced that no one is monitoring their working, they may abuse their power because they have information that is crucial and unknown to the principal, $($Di Donato, $2017).$ According to the Principal$-$Agent Model, the problem can be solved by performing increased monitoring of customs officials to eliminate these opportunities. However, this model is less effective particularly where corruption is a system vice in the customs body. In such situations, the monitoring authorities themselves may be involved in corrupt practices, making such a model unworkable $($Persson et al$.,2013).$ Therefore, this weakness calls for an enhanced strategy as a way of fighting corruption in the customs administrations.

Another more framework is the Collective Action Theory that provides broader view at the situation with corruption. While the Principal$-$Agent Model solely imposed the problem of corruption to management inefficiency, the Collective Action Theory stated that corruption is a systemic problem; rather it was a collective problem that correlates organizational culture. If corruption is rampant, people feel that they are right or even obliged to engage in it because of cultural intolerance of corruption within the customs administration. Thus, anti$-$corruption activities should shift from merely identifying corrupt activities and punishable individuals to modifying group and shared conduct and principles. This change in tact is much more relevant in countries that have a culture of corruption as it is a new culture that needs to be adopted at customs administration.

In the last few years, policy makers have looked into behavioral economics as a way to making new works on anti$-$corruption policies, particularly those in developed nations. Behavioral science, which grew into an important tool in policy$-$making in $2010$ with the formal launch of the $$Nudge Unit$$ in Britain, examines how psychological and social influences affect decision$-$making processes. These way governments know the behavioral disposition of customs officials and can put in place measures that make the officials act with moral character but without favoring punitive measures. This scheme has been used in other areas like; tax compliance, public health and can also be applied in customs anti$-$corruption agenda $($OECD$,2017).$

Therefore one can conclude that the traditional approaches as to the strategy of combating corruption, such as the Principal$-$Agent Model though offer some theoretical framework for the anti$-$corruption battle, do not suffice if corruption is rife within a customs administration. As for the behaviorist approach, both are considered to be more suitable for eradicating systematic corruption. Customs administrations should consider treating corruption as a systems problem where corrupt conduct results from organizational and psychological factors in order to introduce approaches that would promote integrity. Finally, of the three broad categories of interventions, BI is identified as a low$-$cost$,$ high$-$impact solution to ensure ethical behaviors among customs officers and officials. This includes fighting corruption through accreditation, policies and information on anti$-$corruption groups, IT systems, and other methods of encouraging administrative behavior. These approaches not only fix the deficiencies of conventional anti$-$corruption policies but also offer considerable promise for constructing a more transparent as well as customs organization in an international perspective $($Kumanayake$,2021)$

After reading these literature reviews make a comparison among $2$ articles if possible in paragraph format