It was May 3, 2001 at Quantico Marine base in Virginia, and Colonel Stephen Ross was in a quandary. As the newly appointed Program Manager for the Marine Asset Tracking System (MARTRAK), Ross had to formulate an acquisition strategy for an information system that would use commercial hardware and a combination of commercial and custom-developed software. MARTRAK was not large (ACAT Il) but it filled an important operational requirement. A draft RFP had been issued in February 2001, and Ross knew from the responses that at least two firms (Raytheon and Lockheed-Martin) were interested and capable. Since MARTRAK was a new system, and more than one company had the ability to develop it, there was no basis for a sole-source acquisition strategy. That was somewhat disappointing to Ross because his last program had been a sole-source contract in which he had successfully used a streamlining approach called "alpha acquisition." Ross now viewed himself as something of an expert on the alpha approach. He had given a presentation, entitled "Sh01tening the Cycle Time from Requirement to Contract Award" at several DOD conferences. In his presentation he described his success, the benefits of alpha contracting, and the lessons that he had learned from using it.

Ross was now in charge of the MARTRAK program largely because his current boss had heard his presentation at a recent Naw acquisition symposium and was impressed. Ross' previous program had been the Navy's Common Reconnaissance Assessment Module (CRAM), an ACAT Ill intelligence fusion system, for which there was only one film with the necessary capabilities and security qualifications. With alpha contracting, the statement of work, the draft request for proposals, the contractor proposal, and the subsequent contract changes had been developed collaboratively by a combined U.S. Marine Corps and contractor team that freely shared ideas and information. This shaved an estimated seven months off the acquisition schedule and saved an estimated $400,000. The time and cost savings were estimated by comparing it to the more traditional process in which documentation was prepared by each side and serially exchanged.

General Bixby, the Program Executive Officer, had handpicked Ross for MARTRAK because of Ross' success with the alpha contracting approach. He had told Ross: "I was vexy impressed with your presentation at Nav-Acq 2000. Too often programs get bogged down in the process of getting on contract." Bixby had explained that Milestone B approval for MARTRAK had been given and that money was in the budget (some of which expired September 30, 2001). "I'd like to move out fast," Bixby stated. "I told the [Milestone Decision Authority] MDA at the Milestone B meeting that we could award a contract for system development and demonstration by the end of the fiscal year, and be ready for a Milestone C decision by December 2002. I emphasized that we would be seizing every opportunity to streamline the process and shorten cycle times."

But now, two weeks into his job, Ross realized that there was no way to justify a sole source acquisition strategy for MARTRAK, so the alpha process that he had been touting really didn't apply. And with alpha contracting ruled out, Ross didn't know what other streamlining he might employ. He gazed out his office window at the Virginia woods, fully leafed out after the April rain, and wondered what he should tell Bixby.

The Traditional Sole-Source Acquisition

Traditionally, the process for accomplishing sole-source acquisitions of information technology had been as depicted in Figure 1 below. The process had been conducted at atmslength, with the buyer (Government) and the seller (contractor) each preparing documents in response to the previous document from the other party. Serial exchanges of documentation resulted in eventual convergence on an acceptable contract.

The advantage of this approach was thought to be the preservation of integrity. That is, the Government revealed only its requirements, and the contractor was fully responsible for proposing a solution to the requirements. This was thought to insure that the contractor didn't influence the requirements and the Government didn't drive the solution.

The Alpha Contracting Process

In contrast, the alpha process compressed these serial exchanges into collaborative team efforts, thereby cutting out delays and reducing miscommunications. Although the Federal

I saw your presentation on alpha contracting. I've worked a few alpha acquisitions myself and you're right, it's a great way to streamline the process leading up to contract award. I'm just not sure how we can exploit any of that for MARTRAK. The only thing similar to alpha that I've seen work in the competitive acquisition process is the contractor-government proposal team concept that was first employed in the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) program. In that program months were shaved off of the system development time by awarding two contracts for prototype development and assigning a dedicated government team to each contractor to help them prepare their proposals for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMI)) down-select.

But JDAM was a big program with high-level OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) suppoft at OSD and money and staffto make the process work. Your program is small, and you only have five other people in your program office. The approach for JDAM involved a competitive fly-off and subsequent

But at the Milestone B meeting last month Bixby pitched award of a single contract for total system development (he said the low risk of MARTRAK made a fly-off unnecessaty).

So I wish I knew what to tell you, but I just don't see opportunities for streamlining MARTRAK. It's a classic case of write the statement of objectives, create an RFP, issue the RFP, negotiate, and award. There's no way you're going to get from here to award by September 30.

During the next two days, Ross had phoned and emailed some of his old classmates from APMC and EPMC, asking for their advice. The responses had not been encouraging. One classmate told Ross about a mainframe computer acquisition that he had conducted for the Naval Postgraduate School ten years earlier. The acquisition was similar in that he had procurement funds that would expire at the end of the fiscal year. He had issued an RFP thatsaid "this contract will be awarded without negotiations." The no-negotiations tactic had allowed them to ink a contract on September 29, but a protest from the losing vendor had immediately followed. In retrospect, he thought the strategy was ill-advised.

Another classmate had talked about the efficacy of government-wide acquisition contracts (GWACs). These multiple award contracts (he cited several that were maintained by the Army, DISA, and GSA) were designed to save time by pre-qualifying system engineering and software development firms. Any government agency whose requirements fell within the scope of the GWAC could compete its requirements among the pre-qualified firms on the GWAC. The trouble was that the classmate wasn't sure whether Raytheon and Lockheed (the two firms that had already expressed interest in MARTRAK) were on these GWACs. And even if they were, he had indicated that going the GWAC route might result in even more competition and the necessity to evaluate more proposals.

Ross had contacted the Agency points of contact for each of the three GWACs mentioned by his classmate. Ross discovered that all three were contracts for "System Engineering and

Technical Assistance" and both Raytheon and Lockheed were on two of them. Unfoftunately, the Acquisition Regulation (FAR) hadn't specifically addressed the alpha process, the process had been applied successfully on numerous programs.

Offices that had applied the alpha process to sole-source acquisitions had been very pleased. They generally found that the "integrity" of the traditional approach was something of a red herring. Allowing the contractor an opportunity to influence requirements and allowing the Government input into the solution resulted in a much more effective program.

Ross knew that the alpha process had been devised for the sole-source acquisition environment. The joint collaborative team approach would be an odd mechanism for a competitive environment, in which the Government had to insure a "level playing field" in which each competing firm got exactly the same information (no more and no less) as the others. To do otherwise would run the risk of a protest of unfair competitive advantage.

Ross was scheduled for a meeting with General Bixby during the upcoming week, a

meeting in which he would have to outline his initial strategy for MARTRAK. He had already contacted some of his colleagues, looking for ideas. He had sent an e-mail to his contracting officer, Major Arnold, but had gotten mixed messages. The contracting officer had responded:

MARTRAK requirements didn't seem to fit into the scope of any of the three GWACs. Because of the scope mismatch, Ross had reluctantly concluded that the GWAC approach was not a promising one.

Ross was anxious. He had been hired because of his successful streamlining of the CRAM program. Now he was in the middle of a totally different kind of acquisition, and his boss expected him to come up with a streamlined approach. What could he do between now and his next meeting with Bixby? The recommendation he'd like to provide was to slip the planned award date at least six months. But what if Bixby balked? Was there any kind of viable alternative that he could offer?

What is the main issue of the case from Col Ross' view point? Is this the most important issue to consider?

What other perspectives do we need to consider?

How can Ross apply some elements of the alpha contracting approach?

What would you recommend to Bixby? Why is this the best alternative?