JUST C & D

Each depositor has the option to withdraw their deponits of do nothing The bank operater under a sequetitial servioe constraint, but Alison is fiester wo if both agents try to withdraw their funds ahe will arrive at the bank first. (i) Calculate the expected payoffs for Jamie and Alison for each potential outcome. (b) Using your answer from part (a), write down the payoff matrix. What is the largest value of x for which both agents doing nothing is a Nash equilibritum? (c) Now suppose the government introduces deporit insurance that guarantees 100% of each depositor's lossis up to a maximum of $80. Calculate expected pisyoffs for each potential outcome. (d) Using your answer from part (c), write down the piyof matrix. What is the largest value of x for which both agents doing nothing is a Nash equilibrium? Does deposit insurance help prevent bank runs in this modelf Why or why not? Each depositor has the option to withdraw their deponits of do nothing The bank operater under a sequetitial servioe constraint, but Alison is fiester wo if both agents try to withdraw their funds ahe will arrive at the bank first. (i) Calculate the expected payoffs for Jamie and Alison for each potential outcome. (b) Using your answer from part (a), write down the payoff matrix. What is the largest value of x for which both agents doing nothing is a Nash equilibritum? (c) Now suppose the government introduces deporit insurance that guarantees 100% of each depositor's lossis up to a maximum of $80. Calculate expected pisyoffs for each potential outcome. (d) Using your answer from part (c), write down the piyof matrix. What is the largest value of x for which both agents doing nothing is a Nash equilibrium? Does deposit insurance help prevent bank runs in this modelf Why or why not