Need help answering these.

1. (5 points) Consider a model with 11 rms who choose price to maximize prot. Marginal Costs is constant at .20 and there are no xed costs. Consumers will chose the product which is cheaper regardless of how small a difference. What is the Nash Equilibrium pricing strategy of each rm? 2. (10 points) Consider the following two variations of an incumbent firm's decision to engage in Research and Development that will lower its marginal cost relative to an entrant but since the R&D is costly, it is only advantageous to engage in it if entry occurs in order to give the incumbent a cost advantage. i. In Variation 1, the incumbent rm chooses whether or not to engage in R&D, the potential entrant observes this decision and then decides whether or not to enter. The extensive form representation of this game is below, and payoffs are written as (Incumbent Payoff, Entrant Payoff). What is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game? Enter Don't Enter (15.99,o) (11.10, .63) (11,3) (15,0) ii. In Variation 2, the incumbent firm and the entrant make their decisions simultaneously. This is indicated by the information set around the entrant's choice in the extensive form game below. What is the Nash Equilibrium in this case? You may find it useful to set up the normal form representation of this game but it is not necessary. Is there a dominant strategy for either player? Don't Enter (15.99,0) (11,3) (11.10, .63) (16,0) iii. In Variation 3, the entrant decides whether or not to enter rst. Then the incumbent observes this choice and decides whether or not to invest. You may choose to draw the extensive form representation of this game but it is not required. What is the subgame perfect Nash Eq'm of this game? Is there a rst mover advantage to this game