Part $1(1$ point$)$

Consider a market with a demand curve given $($in inverse form$)$ by $\backslash ($ P$($Q$)=60-0\mathrm{.}25$ Q $\backslash ),$ where $\backslash ($ Q $\backslash )$ is total market output and $\backslash ($ P $\backslash )$ is the price of the good. Two firms compete in this market by sequentially choosing quantities $\backslash ($ q$\_\{1\}\backslash )$ and $\backslash ($ q$\_\{2\}\backslash )($where $\backslash ($ q$\_\{1\}+$q$\_\{2\}=$Q $\backslash )).$

This is an example of

Choose one:

A$.$ Cournot competition.

B$.$ Bertrand competition.

C$.$ perfect competition.

D$.$ Stackelberg competition.

Part $2(4$ points$)$

Now suppose the cost of production is constant at $\backslash (\backslash$$ $30\mathrm{.}00\backslash )$ per unit $($and is the same for both firms$).$ If the two firms are maximizing profit, the leader will produce units and the follower will produce units. The total amount of production will be units and the price of the good will be $\backslash$$

$(($Give all numerical answers to two decimal places.$)$