Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split $2. Each playerinames an amount,si, between 0 and 2 for herself. These numbers do not have to be in whole dollar units. The choices are made simultaneously. Each player's payoff is equal to her own money payoff. Ifs1+s22, then the players get the amounts that they named, and the remainder, if any, is destroyed. Ifs1+s2>2, then both players get $1.

This situation could be formulated as a normal form game below: (i) Two players: Player 1 and Player 2 (ii) Action sets: [0,10] for each player (iii) Utility functions: 14 (X1,*2) = Xir if x1 + x2 $ 10 , for i = 1,2. 0, if x1 + X2 > 10 (a) (10 marks ) Does any player have a (strongly or weakly ) dominated action? If yes, which are they? If no, explain why. (b) (10 marks) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game