please answer 1.3 and 1.4

Two farmers consider planting a crop (Plant) or not planting but at- tempting to steal the other's crop at harvest time (Steal). Consider the noncooperative game described by this payoff matrix, table B. 1.3 Suppose you were the row player and that you assign some probability, p, to the likelihood that the column player will play Plant (you believe they will play Steal with probability (1p). What is the minimum value of p that would induce you to plant? 1.4 Define risk-dominant strategy and risk-dominant equilibrium, and say which (if either) of the equilibria is risk dominant. TABLE B Noncooperative Plant/Steal Game Plant Steal Plant Steal 1,1 12, -1 -1, 122 0,0 Two farmers consider planting a crop (Plant) or not planting but at- tempting to steal the other's crop at harvest time (Steal). Consider the noncooperative game described by this payoff matrix, table B. 1.3 Suppose you were the row player and that you assign some probability, p, to the likelihood that the column player will play Plant (you believe they will play Steal with probability (1p). What is the minimum value of p that would induce you to plant? 1.4 Define risk-dominant strategy and risk-dominant equilibrium, and say which (if either) of the equilibria is risk dominant. TABLE B Noncooperative Plant/Steal Game Plant Steal Plant Steal 1,1 12, -1 -1, 122 0,0