Please answer the following 2 problems!

Consider the four-period, altemating-offer bargaining game. Suppose that the discount factors for the two players are 61 = 0.6 and 62 = 0.7 respectively. In this game, player 1 makes the rst offer in period 1. If player 2 rejects this offer, then the game continues in period 2, where player 2 makes a counteroffer and player 1 decides whether to accept or reject it. If player 1 rejects this offer, then the game continues in period 3, where player 1 makes another offer and player 2 decides whether to accept or reject it. If player 2 rejects this offer, then the game continues in period 4, where the player 2 makes the final o'er and player 1 accepts or rejects it. Find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. Is agreement reached in equilibrium? If so, in which period? If not, explain why not. Is the equilibrium outcome efficient? What are the two players' payoffs in equilibrium? Find the condition on the discount factor under which cooperation can be supported in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Use a trigger strategy prole. Assume a two- period detection lag. That is, a player cannot detect a deviation until 2 periods have passed. (Each player in period t can only observe past actions up to and including period t 2.)