Please dont skip any small steps.

(15 points) Consider the following two person game. Player 2 L C R T (0,0) Player 1 M {0, 0) B (1,1) a. (2 points) Does this game have any Nash equilibria? If so, find them all. b. (10 points) Suppose the game is repeated infinitely many times. Player 1 discounts the future at rate 51 and Player 2 discounts the future at rate 52 so that if Pa is the payoff for player i in stage t, that player's total discounted payoff is 22:16:23)\". Consider a Grim Trigger strategy: the Players agree to play (T, L] as long as the history of play consists of only (T, L). If either player deviates, the players will play (B , R). What is the minimum 61 and 52 needed to sustain this strategy? (Hint: Consider the payoffs for deviating for each player)