Thanks a lot.

(15 points) Consider the 2player game given below. Player 1 can choose between T and B, player 2 chooses between R and L. The resulting payoffs are given by the table. (a) Consider first the case where a: = 0 (and this is common knowl edge). Find the set of strategies (pure or mixed) which are rationalizable, i.e. survive the iterated elimination of strategies which are never a best response. (b) Now consider the case where the value of a: is unknown to player 1, but known to player 2 (so that the game is one of \"incom plete information"). Assume that :6 can take only the values 0 (with probability 1/10) or 6 (with probability 9/10). and this is commonly known. Write down a corresponding normal form game that is suitable to find the (Bayes)Nash equilibria of this game. Use EITHER the Harsanyi form OR the Selten form to do this. Find all pure strategy (Bayes)Nash equilibria of this game. 1 (15 points) Consider the following normal form game, where player l's pure strategies are D, E and F and player 2's strategies are A, B, and C. (As usual, the first entry in every field corresponds to player 1's payoff, the second entry to player 2.) A B C D 0,9 2,10 7,7 E 2,3 2,3 7,1 F 0,1 3,2 7,0 (a) Is strategy D iteratively undominated, i.e. survives the elimina tion of strategies that are strictly dominated? (b) Find the set of all Nash equilibria (pure or mixed)