Question: please help me answer this question quickly , thanks ! Consider a first price sealed bid auction with two bidders with valuations distributed uniformly in

 please help me answer this question quickly , thanks ! Consider

please help me answer this question quickly , thanks !

a first price sealed bid auction with two bidders with valuations distributed

Consider a first price sealed bid auction with two bidders with valuations distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 1]. Differently from the example we derived in the lectures, instead of being risk neutral, bidders are risk averse; in particular, their utility function is equal to u(x) = VE. Please upload a pdf in which you answer the following: a) Derive the equilibrium bids. In doing so you may assume that equilibrium bids are linear on the bidders' valuations. [) Are bidders more or less aggressive than when they are risk neutral? Interpret your

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