Please help me answer this question step by step, thanks so much.

1. Consider the preferences of voters A, B, and C over policies 33, y, and z in the following table. Voter A B C most preferred X y Z next most preferred y z X least preferred 2 X y (a) Show whether or not this set of policies results in a Condercet cycle. 03) (f) Suppose that each policy corresponds to different level spending on defence and that z z > :8. Plot these preferences on a graph and determine, which, if any, of these voters has single peaked preferences. Suppose that each policy corresponds to different level of a single dimensional policy, p, where z > a: > 1;. Plot these preferences on a graph and determine, which, if any, of these voters has single peaked preferences. An agenda is an ordering of the votes: Winneplvspvspg, where pg, i : 1, 2, 3 are chosen from the set of policies {33, y, z}, where all policies must be voted upon at least once, and where p,- : Winnepg, 103-) when 10,; gets more votes than pj. What agenda could B choose if all voters vote sincerely. Hint: p3 can be any of 3:, y, or 2. Can either voter A or voter C upset the agenda chosen by voter B by voting strategically, under the assumption that the other voters vote sincerely? Explain