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Question 7 3 pts Suppose two rms compete in quantities (Coumoi) in a market in which demand is described by: PiotrED. each rm incurs no xed cost but has a marginal cost of 20'. Now imagine they collude to produce the monopoly output. Suppose that after the carte1 is established, rm 1 decides to cheat on the collusion1 assuming the other rm will continue to produce its half of the monopoly output. Now how much will rm 1 produce? 05o {3.45 035 OED Question 8 Suppose two rms compete in quantities [Coumoll in a market in which demand is described by: P226tl2D. each rm incurs no xed cost but has a marginal cost of 2D. Now imagine they collude to produce the monopoly output. Suppose that after the cartel is established, rm 1 decides to cheat on the collusion, assuming the other rm will continue to produce its half of the monopoly output. 1What will be the industry price if this continues? @110 CI 1130 C) 120 DEG Question 9 3 pts Suppose tiwo rms compete in quantities (Cournot) in a market in which demand is described by: FEEDED. each rm incurs no xed cost but has a marginal cost of 21]. Now imagine they collude to produce the monopoly output. Suppose that after the cartel is established, rm 1 decides to cheat on the collusion: assuming the other rm will continue to produce its half of the monopoly output. 1Llll'hat will be rm 1's prot if rm 2 continues producing the monopoly outcome? 0 52oo (3 also D asoo (:3: 42m Question 10 3 pts Suppose two rms compete in quantities [Cournot] in a market in which demand is descn'bed hy: FEED2D. each rm incurs no xed cost but has a marginal cost of 21]. Now imagine they collude to produce the monopoly output. Suppose that after the cartel is establishedr rm 1 decides to cheat on the collusion1 assuming the other rm will continue to produce its half of the monopoly output. Should rm 2 respond and increase their quantity? QNo D Yes