Please help with this problem, thanks

Consider the following one-to-one two-sided matching problem: There are three men and two women. Let the set of men be M = {m1, m2, my} and the set of women be W = {w1, w2}. Their preferences are given by m1 : W1, W2, 7 ma : W1, " ma : W2, W1, w1 : m3, m2, m1, - w2 : m1, m3- Here, >x for x ( MUN, is the "preference order" of individual x; when we write " mi- W1, w2, we mean mi strictly prefers wj to w2; when we write > my : W1, we mean w2 is not acceptable to man m2. A matching / specifies who is matched with whom. For example, when we write a = {(m1, w1) , (m2, w2), (m3, 0) } we mean my is unmatched while man i is matched with woman i for i = 1, 2. We say that a matching & is individually rational if no individual strictly prefers to stay single rather than take the partner assigned to him/her by the given matching /. 1. Find all the individually rational matchings for this problem. [15pts] 2. Find all the stable matchings for this problem. [15pts] 3. Describe each round of the man-proposing DA as we have done in class in each round, two kinds of events take place: men propose to women, and women reject offers). Calculate the final result of the man-proposing DA. [15pts]