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4. Consider the game below1 which is innitely repeated. Both players discount the future at rate 5 E (0, 1]- The stage game is (a) (b) (C) (d) Find all Nash equilibria of the stage game. {5pt) Suppose the outcome (U,L} is obtained in t = 0 2 4 .. and (D1 R) is obtained in t = 1,3, 57 3' I 1" 1W'hat is the \"present valueH of each player's payoff"?I (5pt) Suppose player 2's strategy is as follows: start by playing L; if player 1 has played U always in the past) then player 2 plays L; if player 1 has ever played JDT then player 2 plays R forever. Given player 2's strategy3 what's player lls payoff from playing U forever? \"rhat's player 1's payoff from playing D forever? Calculate the discount factor at which player 1 is just indifferent between playing U in every period and D in every period. Call this discount rate 3. (l5pt) Assume 5