Please read the case below and answer the following question: In court, Vinsons allegations were countered by Taylors version of the facts. Will there always be a your word against mine problem in sexual harassment cases? What could Vinson have done to strengthen her case?

Consenting to Sexual Harassment

THE CASE OF VINSON V. TAYLOR, HEARd BEFOREthe federal district court for the District of Columbia, Mechelle Vinson alleged that Sidney Taylor, her supervisor at Capital City Federal Savings and Loan, had sexually harassed her.73But the facts of the case were contested.In court Vinson testified that about a year after she began working at the bank, Taylor asked her to have sexual relations with him. She claimed that Taylor said she owed him because he had obtained the job for her. Although she turned down Taylor at first, she eventually became involved with him. She and Taylor engaged in sexual relations, she said, both during and after business hours, in the remaining three years she worked at the bank. The encounters included intercourse in a bank vault and in a storage area. Taylor was Vinsons supervisor, the court reasoned that notice to him was not notice to the bank.Vinson appealed the case, and the Court of Appeals held that the district court had erred in three ways. First, the district court had overlooked the fact that there are two possible kinds of sexual harassment. Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson distinguished cases in which the victims continued employment or promotion is conditioned on giving in to sexual demands and those cases in which the victim must tolerate a substantially discriminatory work environment. The lower court had failed to consider whether Vinsons case involved harassment of the second kind.Second, the higher court also overruled the district courts finding that because Vinson voluntarily engaged in a sexual relationship with Taylor, she was not a victim of sexual in the bank basement. Vinson also testified that Taylor often actually assaulted or raped her. She contended that she was forced to submit to Taylor or jeopardize her employment.Taylor, for his part, denied the allegations. He testified that he had never had sex with Vinson. On the contrary, he alleged that Vinson had made advances toward him and that he had declined them. He contended that Vinson had brought the charges against him to get even because of a work-related dispute.In its ruling on the case, the court held that if Vinson and Taylor had engaged in a sexual relationship, that relationship was voluntary on the part of Vinson and was not employment related. The court also held that Capital City Federal Savings and Loan did not have notice of the alleged harassment and was therefore not liable. Assuming the truth of Vinsons version of the case, do you think her employer, Capital City Federal Savings and Loan, should be held liable for sexual harassment it was not aware of? Should the employer have been aware of it? Does the fact that Taylor was a supervi-sor make a difference? In general, when should an employer be liable for harassment?4.What steps do you think Vinson should have taken when Taylor first pressed her for sex? Should she be blamed for having given in to him? Assuming that there was sexual harassment despite her acquies-cence, does her going along with Taylor make her partly responsible or mitigate Taylors wrongdoing?5.In court, Vinsons allegations were countered by Taylors version of the facts. Will there always be a your word against mine problem in sexual harassment cases? What could Vinson have done to strengthen her case?harassment. Voluntariness on Vinsons part had no bearing, the judge wrote, on whether Taylor made Vinsons toleration of sexual harassment a condition of her employment. Third, the Court of Appeals held that any discriminatory activity by a supervisor is attributable to the employer, regardless of whether the employer had specific notice.In his dissent to the decision by the Court of Appeals, Judge Robert Bork rejected the majoritys claim that vol-untariness did not automatically rule out harassment. He argued that this position would have the result of depriving the accused person of any defense, because he could no longer establish that the supposed victim was really a willing participant. Judge Bork contended further that an employer should not be held vicariously liable for a super-visors acts that it didnt know about.Eventually the case arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the majority verdict of the Court of Appeals, stating that:[T]he fact that sex-related conduct was voluntary, in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.. . . The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her con-duct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.The Court, however, rejected the Court of Appealss posi-tion that employers are strictly liable for the acts of their supervisors, regardless of the particular circumstances.