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Kaup v. Texas

PER CURIAM

This case turns on theFourth Amendmentrule that a confession "obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest" may not be used against a criminal defendant. After a 14-year-old girl disappeared in January 1999, the Harris County Sheriff's Department learned she had had a sexual relationship with her 19-year-old half brother, who had been in the company of petitioner Robert Kaupp, then 17 years old, on the day of the girl's disappearance. On January 26th, deputy sheriffs questioned the brother and Kaupp at headquarters; Kaupp was cooperative and was permitted to leave, but the brother failed a polygraph examination (his third such failure). Eventually he confessed that he had fatally stabbed his half sister and placed her body in a drainage ditch. He implicated Kaupp in the crime.

Detectives immediately tried but failed to obtain a warrant to question Kaupp. Detective Gregory Pinkins nevertheless decided (in his words) to "get [Kaupp] in and confront him with what [the brother] had said. In the company of two other plain clothes detectives and three uniformed officers, Pinkins went to Kaupp's house at approximately 3 a.m. on January 27th. After Kaupp's father let them in, Pinkins, with at least two other officers, went to Kaupp's bedroom, awakened him with a flashlight, identified himself, and said, "'we need to go and talk.'Kaupp said "'Okay.'The two officers then handcuffed Kaupp and led him, shoeless and dressed only in boxer shorts and a T-shirt, out of his house and into a patrol car. The state points to nothing in the record indicating Kaupp was told that he was free to decline to go with the officers.

hey stopped for 5 or 10 minutes where the victim's body had just been found, in anticipation of confronting Kaupp with the brother's confession, and then went on to the sheriff's headquarters. There, they took Kaupp to an interview room, removed his handcuffs, and advised him of his rights underMirandav.ArizonaKaupp first denied any involvement in the victim's disappearance, but 10 or 15 minutes into the interrogation, told of the brother's confession, he admitted having some part in the crime. He did not, however, acknowledge causing the fatal wound or confess to murder, for which he was later indicted.

A seizure of the person within the meaning of the Fourth andFourteenth Amendments occurs when, "taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. This test is derived from Justice Stewart's opinion inUnited Statesv.Mendenhall,which gave several "[e]xamples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave," including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."

Although certain seizures may be justified on something less than probable cause,we have never "sustained againstFourth Amendmentchallenge the involuntary removal of a suspect from his home to a police station and his detention there for investigative purposes ... absent probable cause or judicial authorization." Such involuntary transport to a police station for questioning is "sufficiently like arres[t] to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause."

The state does not claim to have had probable cause here, and a straightforward application of the test just mentioned shows beyond cavil that Kaupp was arrested within the meaning of theFourth Amendment, there being evidence of every one of the probative circumstances mentioned by Justice Stewart inMendenhall.3A 17-year-old boy was awakened in his bedroom at three in the morning by at least three police officers, one of whom stated "we need to go and talk." He was taken out in handcuffs, without shoes, dressed only in his underwear in January, placed in a patrol car, driven to the scene of a crime and then to the sheriff's offices, where he was taken into an interrogation room and questioned. This evidence points to arrest even more starkly than the facts inDunawayv.New York.

Since Kaupp was arrested before he was questioned, and because the state does not even claim that the sheriff's department had probable cause to detain him at that point, well-established precedent requires suppression of the confession unless that confession was "an act of free will [sufficient] to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Demonstrating such purgation is, of course, a function of circumstantial evidence, with the burden of persuasion on the state. SeeBrown, 422 U.S., at 604. Relevant considerations include observance ofMiranda, "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

The record before us shows that only one of these considerations, the giving ofMirandawarnings, supports the state, and we held inBrownthat "Mirandawarnings,aloneandper se, cannot always ... break, forFourth Amendmentpurposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. All other factors point the opposite way. There is no indication from the record that any substantial time passed between Kaupp's removal from his home in handcuffs and his confession after only 10 or 15 minutes of interrogation. In the interim, he remained in his partially clothed state in the physical custody of a number of officers, some of whom, at least, were conscious that they lacked probable cause to arrest. In fact, the state has not even alleged "any meaningful intervening event" between the illegal arrest and Kaupp's confession. Unless, on remand, the state can point to testimony undisclosed on the record before us, and weighty enough to carry the state's burden despite the clear force of the evidence shown here, the confession must be suppressed. Unless, on remand, the state can point to testimony undisclosed on the record before us, and weighty enough to carry the state's burden despite the clear force of the evidence shown here, the confession must be suppressed.

The judgment of the State Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.