Please solve the question below about game theory

Two players engage in the following interaction regarding the battle of the sexes. Player 1 rst decides whether she wants to \"play\" (Y) or not (N). If player 1 chooses N, then the game is over, and players receive payoffs (2, 3). If player 1 chooses Y, then player 2 (observes player 1's choice and) decides whether he wants to \"play\" (y) or not (n). If player 2 chooses n, then the game is over, and players receive payoffs (3,2). If player 2 chooses y, then the players play the following version of the battle of the sexes game in which they choose actions simultaneously. a b A 4,1 0,0 B 0,0 1,4 (a) Draw the extensiveform of the game. (b) How many subgames does this game have (including the game itself)? Draw each subgame as a separate tree. (c) Find all purestrategy subgame perfect equilibria of the game. (d) Does the game have any Nash equilibrium in which both players decide to \"play\" (i.e., player 1 chooses Y and player 2 chooses y)