popular 737 plane. When the 737 MAX made its first flight in 2016, Boe- ing recommended that training could safely be limited to computer-based Disastrous Conflict at Boeing in 2010. Boeing was caught by sur- I . announced it would introduce a new version of its A320 jet with fuel-saving engines. The new model would be education in place of a flight simula otherwise so similar that customer air. tor. Less than three years later, tragedy lines could skip the expense of retrain struck twice: 737 MAX jets taking off ing pilots. Boeing quickly announced from Indonesia and Ethiopia crashed that it would similarly update its soon after takeoff, killing their crews and passengers. In both cases, a faulty stabilizer pushed down the let's nose. triggering multiple warning devices that pilots were unprepared to deal with The circumstances are still being Investigated, but various conflicts may have played a role. Some involved tensions between management and 517 employees regarding cost cutting as Boeing moved to get the 737 MAX into production and into customers' hangars Boeing uses pilots to test its planes and train customers' pilots to fly them Training started as a ser vice accompanying sales, but Boeing more recently saw potential in making it profitable Boeing shifted work from employee pilots to contractors Say. ing this would compromise quality, the pilots formed a union. The company then moved its hight simulators from Seattle, where the unionized pilots wore, to Miami When they were in Seattle, the pilots who work for Boeing would consult with engineers and tell them about situations they experienced in the cockpit Moving training to Miami disrupted these informal exchanges of information. In addition Boeing sawa departure of other skilled labor, includ ing experts in human factors, or the way people interact with machines Their absence became another risk to designing a safe jet One glaringomis slon: Apparently no one tested pilots reaction to the type of malfunction that caused the crashes Other conflicts emerged after the crashes. CEO Dennis Muilenburg met with other executives to decide on path forward. Muilenburg, trained as an engineer and with experience in Boe- ing's defense division is said to have focused on how to ensure the 737 MAX-by for the company's biggest source of revenue-could keep flying He noted there was not yet proof that the crashes had the same cause. Some in the Federal Aviation Administration wanted to ground the plane. but senior FAA officials agreed with Muilenburg's preference to allow the plane to fly Over the following weeks. as more data became available, the FAA joined other countries regulators in banning the 737 MAX from the air From there, however, the conflict with regulators deepened as state- ments by Muilenburg made pre sumptions about the FAA's position He said that within weeks, the FAA would approve what he called a soft ware enhancement to the right con. trol system, making an already safe aircraft even safer" He observed that the company had properly sought the initial approval to fly and that the FAA had granted it Muilenburg repeatedly made public statements estimating when the planes would be allowed to fly again, even after FAA acting admin istrator Dan Elwell asked him not to keep making promises. Critics had been noting that the FAA had relaxed its regulation of Boeing in the past, and Elwell was concerned about the agency's reputation Later, as the Justice Department investigated whether laws had been broken. Boeing discovered instant messages in which one of its pilots mentioned having unintentionally "basically led to regulators Boeing shared the information with the inves- tigators but not the FAA This led the agency's new administrator, Steve Dickson, to warn Boeing of stricter regulation if it continued to under- mine the FAA After Muilenburg made another prediction that Boeing would have the 737 MAX flying soon, Dick son firmly indicated that his agency would not be following a schedule and would not be allowing the 737 MAX to fly that year During this time. Boeing had contin. ued to assemble 737 MAX jets to fill a backlog of orders. But after Dickson's statement. Muilenburg announced that the company would suspend pro- duction. One week later, the board of directors asked Mudenburg to resign saying the company needed new leadership in order to restore confi- dence and repair relationships with customers and the FAA The follow ing month Dave Colhoun became CEO and Boeing announced tec ommended 737 MAX plats undergo training in the flight Simulator Questions for Discussion 1. Categorize the conflicts discussed in this case as interpersonal intragroup, intergroup, and interorganizational conflicts 2. Review the conflict management strategies. Pick Two and describe briefly how Mulenburg could have used them to handle conflict more effectively 3. Muilenburg was in a position of power, but he did not maintain power effectively enough to keep his job after the 737 MAX jets crashed Of the political strategies for gaining and maintaining power, identify one that could have helped Muilenburg fulfill his role more effectively. How could he have used this strategy? Who would have benefited? Sources Rapet Bong Burned og $138 Billion of Loansust over a Mont Coronavirus Derais Mac Recovery Business he was business.com March 17, 2020. A Tangel Botched Prediction Seite with Regulators Cost Bong CEO 30 The Wall Street Journal www.com January 7.2020 A Pastor.com A Side "Boeing Bad MAX Stor Trang Reversal of Stance. The Wall Street Journal www.icon, January 7, 2020. A Tange A side and A Post Weve Been Home Boeing's CEO Struggles to contain 737 MAX Chess The Wore a www.com December 22, 2019. P. Robson and shaun Bong's Push to Me Traine Profile May Havlat 737 Max Plus prepared. Bomberg Businessweek www.bloomberg.com December 20, 2019 A Toge Cameron and A Side Song to Suspend 237 MAX Production in January The Wall Street Journal.com December 16, 2019