PROBLEM 1: SPLITTING 100 DOLLARS Consider a bargaining situation in which two individuals are considering undertaking a busi- ness venture that will earn them 100 dollars in prot, but they must agree on how to split the 100 dollars. Bargaining works as follows: The two individuals each make a demand simultaneously, where a demand is any number greater or equal to 0. If their demands sum to more than 100 dollars, then they fail to agree, and each gets nothing. If their demands sum to 100 dollars or less, they do the project, each gets his demand, and the rest goes to charity. Each individual's payoff is equal to the money that he gets (either 0 if no agreement is reached, or his demand if an agreement is reached). (They do not value charity.) 1. What are each player's (weakly) dominated actions?1 2. What are the pure action Nash equilibria of this game? Note: You do not need to draw a game matrix for this game. 1You do not need to perform the iterated deletion of dominated actions, but rather just say which actions are weakly dominated for each player in the full game. That is, indicate what demands x are such that, regardless of the other player's demand, there is some other demand y that gives the player a greater or equal payoff than demand