Problem 1. 'Which strategies for each player survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies in the following gates? {Player 1 chooses between rows and receives the rst payoff in the cell, player 2 chooses between columns and receives the second] L C R A 1,1 [1,2 3,1 4,0 Game]: 3 3,21,1 1,3 {1,4 Camel: C 1,6 2,5 {1,4 5,5 D 4,3 6,4 2,1 5,2 T {1,3 3,0 1,1 M 3,1] [1,3 1,1 B 1,1 1,1 6,0 Which strategies are rationalizable? 1What are the Nash equilibria? What is the connection between rationalizability, iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, and Nash equilibrium in 2-player strategic-form games