Question: Problem 2 [ 1 6 points total ] Imagine a suburb called Tusville that is connected to the nearby city of Irving by 2 roads:

Problem 2[16 points total] Imagine a suburb called Tusville that is connected to the nearby city
of Irving by 2 roads: route 1 and route 2. Route 1 is shorter but it gets congested. If the number
of cars on a road is relatively low, drivers can drive at free flow speed (speed limit), but as traffic
builds up, speed goes down and it takes longer to reach Irving from Tusville as shown on Fig. 1:
Figure 1. Time per commuter on Route 1.
Route 2 is newer, wider so it does not get congested, but without congestion on Route 1 it takes
longer to drive between Tusville and Irving on Route 2(30 minutes).
For simplicity, we assume that every commuter on route 1 spends the same amount of time
commuting. It is useful to express the time cost in monetary terms (as shown on Figure 1). This
dollar cost per commuter is like an average cost function where the output is the number N1 of
trips from Tusville to Irving. Total cost TCC1 is then N1 times the average cost of one commuter
as given by Figure 1.
Conversely, the commuting cost for each commuter on Route 2 is $5.00. If N2 commuters select
Route 2, the total cost of the 30 minutes commute is TCC2=$5.00**N2 and the marginal cost is
$5.00.
2.1[4 points] Let us suppose that every weekday morning 5000 residents of Tusville hop into
their cars and drive to work in Irving. In equilibrium, how many commuters will choose each
route?
2.2[6 points] On a graph with 2 vertical axes, one at 0(for TCC1) where N1 increases from left
to right, and another at 5000(for TCC2) where N2 increases from right to left, graph TCC1,
TCC2, and TCC=TCC1+TCC2. Make sure to nicely label each axis. Show your answer to 2.1 and
briefly explain.
2.3[6 points] Find the equilibrium if instead of 5000 commuters there are 3000. Then redo for
4000, and finally for 6000.Problem 2[16 points total] Imagine a suburb called Tusville that is connected to the nearby city
of Irving by 2 roads: route 1 and route 2. Route 1 is shorter but it gets congested. If the number
of cars on a road is relatively low, drivers can drive at free flow speed (speed limit), but as traffic
builds up, speed goes down and it takes longer to reach Irving from Tusville as shown on Fig. 1:
F1gure 1. Iime per commuter on Koute 1.
Route 2 is newer, wider so it does not get congested, but without congestion on Route 1 it takes
longer to drive between Tusville and Irving on Route 2(30 minutes).
For simplicity, we assume that every commuter on route 1 spends the same amount of time
commuting. It is useful to express the time cost in monetary terms (as shown on Figure 1). This
dollar cost per commuter is like an average cost function where the output is the number N1 of
trips from Tusville to Irving. Total cost TCC1 is then N1 times the average cost of one commuter
as given by Figure 1.
Conversely, the commuting cost for each commuter on Route 2 is $5.00. If N2 commuters select
Route 2, the total cost of the 30 minutes commute is TCC2=$5.00**N2 and the marginal cost is
$5.00.
2.1[4 points] Let us suppose that every weekday morning 5000 residents of Tusville hop into
their cars and drive to work in Irving. In equilibrium, how many commuters will choose each
route?
2.2[6 points] On a graph with 2 vertical axes, one at 0(for TCC1) where N1 increases from left
to right, and another at 5000(for TCC2) where N2 increases from right to left, graph TCC1,
TCC2, and TCC=TCC1+TCC2. Make sure to nicely label each axis. Show your answer to 2.1 and
briefly explain.
2.3[6 points] Find the equilibrium if instead of 5000 commuters there are 3000. Then redo for
4000, and finally for 6000.
Problem 2 [ 1 6 points total ] Imagine a suburb

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