Question: Problem 2 Consider the following two player game: Low High Low 3,3 0,9 High 9,0 2,2 What are the Nash equilibria of this game when

 Problem 2 Consider the following two player game: Low High Low

Problem 2 Consider the following two player game: Low High Low 3,3 0,9 High 9,0 2,2 What are the Nash equilibria of this game when it is played only once? Now suppose that this game is repeated infinitely many times and that the players' discount factor is 6. Consider the following trigger strategy. Play Low in the first period and continue to play Low as long as both players have played Low in every previous period. If either player ever plays High, then play High in the next period and every period after. For what values of 6 do these trigger strategies constitute at SPE

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