Problem 3 (Required, 30 marks) *Note: This is a bargaining games with asymmetric discounting factors We consider the 2 players bargaining model as discussed in the lecture. We assume that two players have different discounting factors and let D, and D, be the discounting factors adopted by player 1 and player 2 respectively. (*Note: If D; is small, it indicates that the player is not patient and assign a big discount if the payoff is received at future time). (a) We take T = 2 (i.e. there are 2 rounds of bargaining) () Compute the subgame perfect equilibrium for this games. (i) What conditions on D, and D, gives player 2 an advantages (i.e. player 2 gets more pie than player 1 from the games)? (b) We take T = 3 (i.e. there are 3 rounds of bargaining) (1) Compute the subgame perfect equilibrium for this games. (i) What conditions on D; and D, gives player 2 an advantages (i.e. player 2 gets more pie than player 1 from the games)