Problem A [3 points] Consider the following situation. Nature determines whether the payoffs are as in Game 1, with probability p, or as in Game 2, with probability 1- p. Player 2 learns whether Nature has drawn Game 1 or Game 2, but player 'i does not. Player'l chooses either Tor 3; player 2 simultaneously chooses either L or R. Payoffs are given by the game drawn by Nature. All of this is common knowledge. 50, 50 100, 0 Game 1 (Prob- p) (Prob. 1-p) 1. Describe this situation as a static Bayesian game (players, action spaces, type spaces, beliefs, and utility functions). [1 point] 2. Find all the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this static Bayesian game. [2 points]