Question: Provide a clear proof / solution to this problem on unique stable matchings Let there be n students and n universities, each with capacity one.

Provide a clear proof/solution to this problem on unique stable matchings
Let there be n students and n universities, each with capacity one. Recall that a list of 2n prefer-
ences, vec(>-)=(:>-?1,dots,>-?2n:) defines a stable matching instance. Consider an instance vec(>-) where every
student has exactly the same (strict) preference ordering over universities. That is, for all students
i,j,>-?i=>-?j, but you may not make any assumptions on the university preferences.
Prove that, in any instance vec(>-) where every student has the same strict preferences, that there is
a unique stable matching for vec(>-). That is, there is a single matching M that is stable for vec(>-), and any
other matching M'M is unstable for vec(>-).
 Provide a clear proof/solution to this problem on unique stable matchings

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