Question 10 (a) Consider the following simultaneous-move game with two players, 1 and 2. Show that each player playing each pure strategy with equal probability is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. [6 marks] Player 2 M H 15 Player 1 M H 1,0 (b) Consider the following extensive-form game with two players. Initially, player 1 can either play 'n' to keep the game going, or play 'S," to end the game. If player 1 chooses "T's Player 2 then chooses between "ly" and 'Sy". Finally, if 2 chooses Py player 1 can choose between Py and Sy. The payoffs are written as (Payoff to 1, Payoff to 2). Identify any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. [6 marks] 2.0 1,2 3.3 4.1 (c) Two firms face the following strategic pricing problem. Each firm can set a high price H or a low price L. The payoffs are as follows: Firm 2 L H Firm 1 L 0, 0 5, -1 H -1,5 2, 2 Suppose this pricing game between the firms is repeated infinitely. Firms discount the future, so that, for each firm, a payoff of x received f periods from today is worth s'x today, where 0