Question 2 (IEDS and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria - 40 points, 25 mins) PLAYER 2 L C R U 3, 2 7, 1 0, 0 PLAYER 1 M -2, 3 2, 5 1, 2 D 0,0 4, -3 2, 3 (a) (5 points) Does Player I have any strictly dominated strategies? If so, what are they? (b) (5 points) Does Player 2 have any strictly dominated strategies? If so, what are they? (c) (5 points) What strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strate- gies? Is the game dominance-solvable? (d) (5 points) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (e) (5 points) Will a strictly dominated pure strategy receive a positive probability in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium? Explain. (f) (10 points) Take the reduced game from point (c). Does it admit a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium? If it does, find it. If not, explain why not. (g) (5 points) Describe in 1-2 sentences how you would verify if a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of a reduced game was also a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the corre- sponding full game