Question 5 10 points Save Answer Which of the statements below is TRUE for the following two-player, extensive form game with imperfect information where player 1 has two types and player 2 cannot observe the action of the Nature but observes the actions of oplayer 1: 2, 1 2, 4 U U L R D 0.7 W D 3. 2 1. 3 2 Nature 2 1, 2 3, 2 U 0.3 S U L 1 R D D 1, 1 0, 1 O a. There exists a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which Player 1 of W-type chooses L O b. There exists a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which Player 1 of S-type chooses L O c. There is no separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium O d. The two distinct separating stratgies of player 1 are part of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria