Question 9/ 10 H'- u,- Right 2,1 1,0 with probabilityp Foe Left Right Left 3,0 0,1 Right 2,0 1,1 with probability 1 p Whenp = 1/4, which is a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium: (1 's strategy; 2's type 2's strategy) (Left; Friend - Left, Foe Right); (Left; Friend - Left, Foe - Left); (Right; Friend - Left, Foe - Right); (Right; Friend - Right, Foe - Right); 16:15 X Question 9 / 10 There are two players. The payoffs to player 2 depend on whether 2 is a friendly player (with probability p) or a foe (with probability 1 - p). . Player 2 knows if he/she is a friend or a foe, but player 1 doesn't know. See the following payoff matrices for details. Friend Left Right Left 3,1 0,0 Right 2,1 1,0 with probability p Foe Left Right Left 3,0 0,1 Right 2,0 1,1 with probability 1 - p When p = 1/4, which is a pure strategy K NEXT