Question: how to design a desired mechanism g to implement social choice function

Imagine that you want to sell an item. There are a bunch of prospective buyer agents. You want to sell it to the agent who wants it the most, but you can$$t trust them to tell you the truth. The problem can be formally modelled as follows:

a$.\backslash$theta i in $$: types are the valuations.

b$.$ o in $\{1,...,$ n$\}$: index of agent who gets the item.

c$.$ ui$($o$,\backslash$theta i$)=\backslash$theta i if o $=$ i$,$ and $0$ otherwise.

Question: how to design a desired mechanism g to implement social choice function f$(\backslash$theta $)=$argmaxi$\backslash$theta i$()=$max$$ and with the mechanism g telling the truth is the dominant strategy for all the agents? $($Hint: consider the Vickrey auction.$)$