Question: Select all statements that are false. In an extensive-form game, a Nash equilibrium cannot include non-credible threats If there are more than one subgame perfect

Select all statements that are false. In an extensive-form game, a Nash equilibrium cannot include non-credible threats If there are more than one subgame perfect equilibria, then a player must be indifferent between their actions at some node In an extensive-form game, the whole game tree is also a subgame. The number of subgames in an extensive form game tree equals the total number of nodes in the tree, including the terminal nodes ('leaves')

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