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* Problem 2 Now consider a version of this game in which Player 2 has been told which game is being played, but Player 1 still doesn't know. I want you to think about the impact of giving Player 2 this extra information. This new game also has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. What is it? (Hint: Player 2's strategy must specify what she chooses in the case that the game is X and in the case that it is Y.) Then compare Player 2's payoff in the games from Problems 1 and 2, when 2 does and does not know which game is being played, respectively. What seems strange about this? * Problem 2 Now consider a version of this game in which Player 2 has been told which game is being played, but Player 1 still doesn't know. I want you to think about the impact of giving Player 2 this extra information. This new game also has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. What is it? (Hint: Player 2's strategy must specify what she chooses in the case that the game is X and in the case that it is Y.) Then compare Player 2's payoff in the games from Problems 1 and 2, when 2 does and does not know which game is being played, respectively. What seems strange about this