Solving the Signaling Game . There are four possible types of equilibria we need to consider: . Pooling on L . Pooling on R . Separating, t1 plays L and t2 plays R . Separating, t1 plays R and to plays L . To find all (pure-strategy) equilibria, use the following cookbook to each of the above 'guesses' Find the beliefs of R (SR3), given S's strategy Find the optimal strategy for R given beliefs (SR2R) Check whether S wants to deviate (SR2S) If not, this is a PBE Signaling. Solve for all pure strategy PBE for the following signaling game by following the cookbook from Lecture 10. (2, 1) (2, 1) R (3, 0) d (3, 0) ................. Nature R .......... (3, 0) 11 (4, 2) L t2 R d d (4, 2) (3, 0)