Question: Suppose that each agent's value V; is drawn independently from the same strictly increasing distribution F' [0, h]. Find the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy

 Suppose that each agent's value V; is drawn independently from the

Suppose that each agent's value V; is drawn independently from the same strictly increasing distribution F' [0, h]. Find the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in e a second-price auction with a reserve price of r, e a first-price auction with a reserve price of r, e an all-pay auction with a reserve price of r

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