Question: Suppose that there are two bidders in an all - pay auction. Each of their valuations are independently drawn from the uniform [ 0 ,

Suppose that there are two bidders in an all-pay auction. Each of their
valuations are independently drawn from the uniform [0,1] distribution. Calculate the BNE equilibrium strategies. [Hint: The equilibrium bidding function for a player with valuation v will be in the form b(v)= kv2 for some value k.]

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