Question: Suppose there are three bidders with values for the object that are independent, private and uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Derive the seller's expected revenue

Suppose there are three bidders with values for the object that are independent, private and uniformly distributed over [0, 1].

Derive the seller's expected revenue in a second-price auction

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