Suppose we do an game$-$theory experiment with a group of women in which pairs of women are selected and one woman in each pair is called the primary and the other woman in the pair is the secondary$.$ Each pair only plays one time. You offer the primary woman in each pair a choice of one of the two following options:A$)$ getting $$600$ which would cause the secondary member of the pair to get $$0.$ If the primary woman picks this option, then the secondary woman has no ability to block this outcome. OrB$)$ The primary can choose to divide up $$1,000$ between herself and the secondary with the risk that the secondary woman will reject the offer in which case both women will get nothing. But if the secondary woman accepts the portion of the $$1,000$ that is offered, then both women will take home her fraction of the $$1,000.$ The pairs of women have zero communication during this experiment except to communicate in writing how much $($if anything$)$ the primary woman is offering to divide with the secondary and then whether the secondary woman accepts or rejects the offer. a$)$ Suppose everyone in the experiment is purely selfish and do not care about what life is like for anyone else in the world and everyone knows that everyone is purely selfish. How much would the primary woman get and why?b$)$ How much money does the so$-$called 'nonstrategic view' of bargaining predict that the primary woman will get?c$)$ Suppose that all of the women in the experiment are colleagues that work together at an American company and have known each other for many years. How would that affect the average payout of the secondary woman in an experiment like this relative to the game$-$theory predictions you gave above?