Table 17-4 Consider trade relations between Canada and Mexico. Assume that the leaders of the two countries believe the payoffs to alternative trade policies are as follows: Mexico High Tariffs Low Tariffs Canada High Tariffs Canada trade value = $65 Canada trade value = $140 Mexico trade value = $75 Mexico trade value = $5 Low Tariffs Canada trade value = $35 Canada trade value = $130 Mexico trade value = $285 Mexico trade value = $2757. Refer to Table 17-4. Assume that trade negotiations are repeated each year. In a repeated game scenario, what would be the main difference of the game? a. Mexican negotiators will assume that Canadian negotiators will never retaliate for a noncooperative trade policy. b. Both parties will assume that the other will choose a strategy that optimizes the total value of the trade relationship. c. The Nash equilibrium will provide the largest possible gains to each party. d. Each will follow a dominant strategy based entirely on self-interest